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Abstract. The paper studies the deficiency of the neo liberal policy agenda that aims 
totransform non-governmental organization (NGOs) engaged in poverty alleviationinto 
formal financial institutions seeking access to capital market and performingon a 
commercial basis. It propounds that poverty focused credit programs aimedat distributive 
equity are logically inconsistent with an ethically neutral liberal marketorder. In 
comparison, it is inferred in the paper that Islamic economic principles affirm the logical 
consistency and adequacy to reality of Islamicfinancial program and poverty focused credit 
programs. These programs, as indicated by the welfare banking ofIslamic Banks in 
Bangladesh, seek access to financialmarkets, which are characterized by the presence of 
Shariah instrument prohibiting interest and profiteering and promoting charity. 
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1. Introduction 
 number of NGOs have pioneered credit delivery mechanism for the poor 
in Bangladesh and abroad that consisted of small amounts of collateral free 
loansknown as microcredit, for microenterprise financing. There are 
several hundred NGOs registered in Bangladesh, of whichabout 150 NGOs have 
reasonably large microcredit programs (Alamgir, 1998). A significant aspect of 
microcredit is the dependence of NGOs on foreign grants, especially from IDA, 
USAID, OXFAM and to certain extent from Government of Bangladesh (Alamgir, 
1998). 
There were however, not many agenciesready to provide funds for locally based 
NGOs; neither was there a guarantee about that continuation of donor assistance. 
Microcredit programs needed sources of funds that could be accessed regularly 
(Alamgir, 1998). Mobilisation of resources is, therefore, critical for expansion of 
out reach of these programs. 
A change in the policy is emerging that aims at transforming NGOs from grant -
dependent organization to large profitable institutions providing banking servicesto 
the poor. This, as it is pointed out by the neo-liberal agenda, is the only way to 
reach millions of poor who still do not have access to credit (Sharif, 1997). Of late, 
policies adopted by BRAC in floating a company seeking deposits in the 
commercial market and a few NGOs, including Grameen Bank, turning into 
specializedbanks and borrowing from commercial money market expresses this 
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shift in policy (DBH 2000, Hashemi & Morshed, 1997). The process involves a 
two-stage program. NGOs are to become profitable and graduate into the formal 
financial sector. The improved financial position of the NGOs will facilitate their 
access to thecommercial capital market by attracting savings deposits or by 
investment offunds obtained through securities (Sharif, 1997) The shift in policy 
represents a return to the neo classical liberal market order (Wood & Sharif, 1997). 
It, however, leads to a contradiction that characterizes the NGOs who have 
theobjectives of poverty reduction, which is partly an altruistic schemeand also of 
financial graduation which is a purely utilitarian goal. The process oftransforming 
NGOs into formal financial institutions, therefore, creates an internaltension 
between compassion and capitalism (Greeley, 1997). The ability of a liberal market 
order premised on efficiency to generate funds for programs that arebasically 
altruistic in nature needs closer scrutiny. This paper examines the 
logicalconsistency of this new policy agenda focusing mainly on the aspect relating 
toNGOs accessing capital market for on-lending to the poor. 
A different approach has been adopted by Islamic schemes of micro 
enterprisefinancing which stand apartfrom the above neo -liberal framework of 
financing. Anumber of Islamic Banks and NGOs, which function in accordance 
with Islamiceconomics principles, have mobilized resources for entitlement 
formation by thepoor on the basis of Shariah principles and profit - loss sharing 
(Sarkar, 1998; Athar & Loqman, 1998). In an Islamic frame work, the lender or 
investor is placed inthe context of norms dictated by the Shariah (Islamic Law) and 
maximizes withinthis context (Chowdhury, 1991). These norms tend to strike a 
balance betweenindividual interest and regard for others. As a result, the conflicts 
between theforces of efficiency and equity are mitigated by the sanctions in an 
Islamic economic system. 
In this paper, following an introductory part, part 2 of the paper gives the 
objectives and methodology of the study. Part 3 examines the logical consistency 
ofthe new policy agenda aiming to transform NGOs into formal financial 
institutionsin a liberal market order. Part 4 studies the logical consistency ofIslamic 
economic principles and the Shariah as a basis for Islamic banking and poverty -
focused credit programs. In part 5, adequacy to reality of Shariah principles as a 
basis for banking and microcredit programs is examined in the light of actual 
experience of Islamicbanking and microcredit programs, particularly in 
Bangladesh. Part 6 summarizesthe findings and conclusions of the study. 
 
2. Objectives and Methodology 
The objectives of the paper are as follows: 
a) To evaluate the logical consistency and validity of the modern approach 
thatenvisages NGOs to graduate into formal financial sector providing credit 
withfunds from the commercial market. 
b)  To assess, as an alternative, the logical consistency and adequacy to realityof 
Islamic system of banking and microenterprise financing with special reference to 
Bangladesh. 
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The study is based on secondary data. Data on microenterprisefinancing 
byIslamic Bank Bangladesh Ltd (IBBL) were obtained from monthly statement of 
the bank. Data on private bank and Islamic bank resource or deposit mobilization 
was obtained from Scheduled bank statistics of Bangladesh Bank. 
 
3. NGOs and the Market Order 
A new trend which is emerging aims at transforming the NGOs from grant-
dependent organization into sound financial institutions with access to the capital 
market for funds (Schmidt & Zeitinger, 1998; Sharif, 1997). The largest institution, 
the Grameen Bank, has turned into a specialised bank and a profit making 
institutionwith funds partly from commercial market. Policy of BRAC, another 
leading NGO, also reveals a similar shift towards dependence on the capital market 
for funds (Hashemi & Morshed, 1997; Yunus, 1999; DBH, 2000). 
The graduation of the NGOs into formal financial sector by linking 
commercialcapital market to the interest of the poor represent apolicy agenda based 
on utilitarian and neoclassical principlesand amarket order that consists of rational 
decision makers (Wood & Sharif, 1997; Chowdhury, 1998). The postulate 
ofrationality states that decision maker in the market maximizes purely 
economicgains. Ethical aspects in decision, making do not appear as important 
consumptionbundles to be maximized (Chowdhury, 1986). These principles are 
distinctfrom and stands somewhat in contrast to altruistic motive, that initially 
guided theformationof the NGOs. The distinction between purely economic or 
egoistic andethical or altruistic motive threatens the premises ofutilitarianism, 
which remains the basis of rational market order (Myrdal, 1965). 
 A brief appraisal of the utilitarian theory illustrates the contradiction that arises 
between compassion and capitalism, as some scholars have noted, in the process of 
turning the NGOs from organizations promoting welfare into fully commercial 
enterprises. 
The logical premise of utilitarianism is hedonistic psychology and economic 
behavior is expressed as a calculus of pleasure and pain. As long as no obstacles 
are created, everyone by acting on his own interest promotes the happiness of all 
(Myrdal, 1965; 1943). The early utilitarians sought religious sanction to support the 
proposition. To these theological utilitarians human behavior, in addition to 
egoistic calculus, is also subject to ethical considerations and moral goal of 
promoting general interest, in accordance with religious precepts. But this and 
similar other attempts emphasized the distinction between egoistic and altruistic 
motives (Myrdal, 1965). Referring to the contradiction Myrdal claimed. 
“As soon as altruism was introduced into the discussion, one was tempted to see 
the criterion of moral conduct in the good or the virtuous feeling which prompts the 
goodwill. Utilitarianism was thus abandoned, for it stands and falls by the thesis 
that an action is good by virtue of its consequences and not by virtue of the will 
which motivates it.” (Myrdal, 1965). 
Altruism was therefore abandoned. Theological utilitarians lost importance after 
Bentham. By rejecting theological sanctions, the later utiliarians create a gap 
between the empirical fact of pleasure and pain and the binding nature of morality. 
They then bridge-up the gap by the doctrine of harmony. Harmony of interest 
based on „purely egoistic‟ and „purely economic interest‟ has become the central 
notion of utilitarianism and liberal market order (Myrdal, 1965). 
For NGOs to graduate into commercial enterprises or Micro Finance 
Institutions (MFIs) require that they meet an „economically efficient‟ market order. 
This uttrilitarian approach imply that market outcome depend on rational 
individuals as maximizing agent, pursuing „purely egoistic‟ and „purely economic 
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interest‟ optimizing utilities based on consumption bundles (Chowdhury, 1986). 
The precept of rationality is based on purely liberal foundations, wherein there is 
no scope for forming social preferences through the mechanism of collective 
preferences or religious conventions; individual preferences and consumer 
sovereignty reign supreme. 
Intertemporal rationality on the part of the lenders or savers in the money 
market provide the basis of capital availability dictated by market forces. This 
signifies policies that rely on interest – based financing. Ethics or altruism do not 
enter as important consumption bundles or as resource, benefit and cost in this 
rational framework. In the utilitarian and neoclassical market order rate of interest 
rations out scarce supply of capital into the uses with highest net productivity; 
capital, in other words‟ is auctioned off in the market for the highest rate of interest 
or dividend it can fetch (Samuelson, 1973). The neoclassical perspective implies 
intensifying competition as opposed to cooperation; NGOs aiming to graduate into 
formal financial sector would be acting as maximizing agents seeing profit and 
competing for funds in the commercial market (Sharif, 1997). The process leads to 
a competitive game between capital and labor (Chowdhury, 1998). In this 
competitive mileu poorer borrowers, lacking other sources of income, are 
frequently left with the option to repay their loans obtained at competitive rate, 
selling asset or defaulting. It prompts poor clients to become part of self - 
exclusionary process, as is evident from the increasing rate of dropout of poorer 
borrowers from credit programs. Therefore, institutions trying to graduate into 
formal financial sector in the neoclassical market order might be doing so at the 
expense of poor borrowers by focusing mainly on a wealthier clientele (Sharif, 
1997) Further, in case of NGOs, the interest mechanism which is an expression of 
this rationality is contrary to „equity‟ principle as it is burdensome for the poor who 
borrow money, because if they fall they are to pay the principal along with interest 
(Akhtar, 1998). 
The utilitarian market order being based on „efficiency‟ with individuals 
maximizing purely economic gains, poverty focused credit programs aimed at 
distributive equity are, therefore, logically inconsistent with markets in a liberal 
framework characterized by lender‟s „rationality‟ and interest-based financing. The 
neo-liberal policy agenda that envisages NGOs graduation into formal financial 
sector in order to access commercial funds reveal the internal tension between 
compassion and capitalism. The dilemma is evident as a scholar poses the question:  
“-can social development fund be raised from the capital market?” (Sharif & 
Wood, 1997). 
 
4. NGOs in an Islamic Economic Framework: Logical 
Consistency 
In the preceding sections, the limitations of utilitarian polices, as they relate to 
NGOs, were discussed. There is no scope in this system for forming preferences 
based on collective preferences; consumer sovereignty and individual preferences 
reign supreme. Ethics or altruism-essential elements of poverty focused programs – 
do not figure as important bundles in this rational framework. The Islamic 
economic framework departs from these principles and behavior, replacing purely 
individual preference by commitment or loyalty to Shariah or Islamic Law. 
The concept of rationality for Shariah is not based on the primacy of the 
individual will acting alone, but acting in the milieu of preferences formed in 
conformity with Islamic Law (Chowdhury, 1991). Compliance with the Sharia 
establishes the principle of the unity of God and of human individual as His 
viceregent. Acts of consumption, production and distribution are treated in relation 
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to humanity‟s felicity attained therefrom. Therefore, these acts are regarded as 
forms or part of worship. Consumer sovereignty is relegated to these tenets in an 
Islamic economic order (Chowdhury, 1991). 
In this Islamic economic framework, ethical aspects in decision making 
represent important consumption bundles which might be termed as 
„imponderables‟. In this context, individuals by maximizing his or her utility is 
really doing so by dispensing altruism to other. The welfare gained by each 
individual is shown to depend not only on his own utility index and those of others, 
but also on his contribution to the utilities of others (Chowdhury, 1986). 
4.1. Investors Choice in an Islamic Framework 
The technique of cost-benefit analysis is being utilized presently as a criteria for 
investment or project choice. An investment or expenditure is undertaken only if 
the estimated benefits exceed the total cost (Weiss, 1967). In an Islamic economic 
framework the idea of cost and benefit in an investment alternative will be different 
from the conventional form. 
Cost in Islamic economics is one of total cost, i.e. the pure economic cost plus 
„non-economic‟ cost component: Total benefit is the sum ofpure economic benefit 
component and pure „non-economic‟ component of benefit. 
In an investment undertaking of the firmthe economic cost may denote the 
outlay in investment based on the firm‟s profit maximization motives. Now 
economic costwould denote the Islamic individuals or firms altruistic expenditure. 
Therefore, pure economic benefit would denote the benefit derived as a result of 
the outlay of economic cost and no economic benefit would denote the benefit 
from non-economic cost. Although the Muslim‟s motivation to incur non-economic 
cost is based purely on his or her Islamic belief or obligation, and the resulting 
benefit, represents his or her reward in the akhira, the worldly equivalents of these 
forms of pure „noneconomic‟ elements of Islamic belief appear in the form of 
increased labour productivity, higher levels of employment and earning of the 
beneficiaries of altruistic expenditures which augment pure economic quantities. 
Non-economic benefit component thus becomes quantifiable and plays an 
important role in decision making in the altruistic sector of Islamic economy 
(Chowdhury, 1986). 
The point to note in this formulation of Islamic decision making and 
preferences is that Islamic „imponderables‟ or ethical aspects enter the utilitarian 
plane as well as the income and resource constraints as essential variable 
(Chowdhury, 1986). This stands in contrast to the internal contradiction generated 
by later utilitarians and neoclassical order within which the NGOs are planning to 
function (part 3). Referring to this conflict in neoclassical liberal order between the 
forces of economic efficiency and distributive equity, a scholar remarks: 
“The root of this structural efficiency-equity conflict in Western politico 
economic order lies in the intrinsic competitive nature of an ethical neutrality of 
Western economic reasoning. Western social and economic institutions that rely on 
these philosophical foundations must then necessarily reflect the underlying 
conflicting type of social choices” (Chowdhury, 1991). 
In the Islamic framework ethical aspects in decision making represent important 
consumption bundles. Individuals by maximizing his or her utility is really doing 
so by dispensing altruism to others. In this framework the presence of 
„neoeconomic‟ and ethical values in the consumption menu of each individual 
narrows the gap between individual‟s preferences based on „pleasure principle‟ and 
the binding nature of morality that the later utilitarian have created by rejecting the 
theological sanctions (part 3). As a result, the conflicts between the forces of 
efficiency and equity are mitigated by the sanctions within an Islamic economic 
system. 
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Poverty focussed credit program aimed at distributive equity are in line with the 
goals of efficiency as well as equity, in a market order within an Islamic economic 
framework. Encouragement of expenditures of philanthropy and constraints on 
wasteful consumption in an Islamic economy imparts an altruistic element in 
consumption behavior which can be imputed to the cost-benefit estimates for 
investment or project choice. In the financial market which acts as source of funds 
for Islamic NGOs, the lender or investor is placed in the context of norms dictated 
by the Shariah and maximizes within this context. These norms motivate the 
individual to strike a balance between individual interest and regard for others, that 
is between the pure economic cost and benefit and the „non-economic‟ 
components. The individual reconciles the rationale with the demands of the 
Shariah and thereby exercise an adaptive form of rationality. Such behavior 
patterns are affirmed by the institutionalist view that mankind is not merely a 
rational chooser but also a product of cultural & social norms; in this case 
emanation form the Shariah.  
As explained earlier, in such an altruistic and cooperative decision making and 
resource allocation, benefits or welfare gained by each individual depend also on 
his or her contribution to the utility of others (Chowdhury, 1986). Thus, Islamic 
principles underscores the consistency of poverty focused credit program seeking 
access to financial market, with investors who exercise an adaptive form of 
rationality, characterized by the presence of altruistic elements in their 
consumption menu, as ordained by the Shariah. 
4.2. Arrow’s Postulate 
Kenneth Arrow differentiates between ordering or preferences according to the 
direct consumption of the individual of purely economic gains and the ordering 
when individuals add standards of equity or ethics. The market mechanism, Arrow 
points out, takes into account only the ordering in accordance with direct economic 
gains and not ordering according to ethics or values (Arrow, 1963). Ethical scheme 
involve choices based on unanimously accepted values rather than a method of 
reconciling diverse individual values. In these schemes individual may be induced 
to decide on the basis of collective preferences or conventions, emanation from a 
religious code which take into account ordering according to values (Chowdhury, 
1991). Consumer sovereignty is relegated to or is induced to conform to the tenets 
of the code or conventions (Chowdhury, 1991). 
It may be underlined here that microenterprise finance aimed at distributive 
equity involves individual choices that are not taken into account solely by the 
market mechanism alone but would require an environment established by 
conventions or institutions collectively accepted, or conventions emanating from a 
religious code. 
In the Islamic economic framework, distributive equity is established by, 
interalia, the mandatory abolition of interest (riba) and profiteering, and entitlement 
formation by poor and workers is established by the institution of mudarabah and 
musharakah (Chowdhury, 1991; Akhtar, 1998). Shariah in an Islamic economy 
introduces standards of equity and ethics to market driven forces and Islamic voter 
or investor in the economy is induced to decide on the basis of collective 
preferences formed through shuratic deliberations. The presence and functions of 
Shariah Council in Islamic Banks in Bangladesh and other countries and the 
welfare banking program established by these Banks is an expression of this 
mechanism and to this effect forms collective preferences establishing an 
environment for entitlement formation by the poor. Therefore, Islamic principles 
underline the consistency of poverty focused program with investors who exercise 
an adaptive form of rationality incorporating altruism and ethics in their 
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consumption menu, as ordained by preferences emanatingformShariah and 
Shuratic deliberations. 
 
5.  NGOs in an Islamic Economic Frame work: Adequacy 
to Reality 
In the preceding sections contradictions characterizing the NGOs leaning 
increasingly toward secular utilitarian principles and seeking access to commercial 
market for funds have been discussed. In this context, logical consistency of the 
poverty focussed credit programs in an Islamic economic framework have also 
been outlined. In this section the adequacy to reality of Islamic economic principles 
and Shariah, for NGOs functioning along Islamic lines, will be examined. 
The environment of the Islamically requisite production and entitlement 
formation by the poor is established by the institutions of cooperation and profit-
sharing termed as Mudarabah and Musharakah as explained below. These and 
other similar Shariah instruments of financing and contract are being widely used 
by Islamic Banks and Islamic NGOs for microenterprise development (Ather & 
Loqman, 1998; Bashir & Darrat, 1992; Akhtar, 1998). 
Mudarabah: Mudarabah financing activity includes two related sectors. The 
first comprise the financial intermediary (bank or an NGO) and a business firm or 
individual entrepreneur while the second comprise the intermediary and individual 
investor. 
This mode of financing brings capital and labor together. It enables capital to 
earn profit by entrusting capital to the entrepreneur or individual who return the 
principal amount plus the agreed share of profit to him after completion of trading 
or production activity. The investor is called Rab-ul-Mal and the agent as Mudarib. 
Rab-ul-Mal participate with his funds and Mudarib with his dexterity and labor in 
the project. They share profit according to the agreed ratio and loss is entirely 
borne by Rab-ul-Mal (Akhtar, 1998; Chowdhury, 1986). 
Musharakah: Musharakah mode of financing envisages both partners providing 
capital. Sharing of profit is stated in the contract and losses are shared according to 
capital contribution. Modern application of Musharakah includes the business 
activities of cooperative societies. 
BaiMuazzal: In case of BaiMuazzal, the bank based on client‟s proposal, 
purchases inputs from the market for the client who repurchases them from the 
bank at a price which include cost plus a mark-up in lumpsum or on installment. 
The price of the input charged by bank has to be fair and just (Akhtar 1998; Bashir 
& Darrat, 1992; Chowdhury, 1986; Chowdhury, 1998). 
A number of financial institutions in many Islamic countries based their 
activities on Shariah principles, particularly profit and loss sharing (PLS) 
arrangement replacing the interest payment system (Chowdhury, 1986; Sarkar, 
1998). One of these institutions is the Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL) in 
Bangladesh. The Bank functions in accordance with Shariah principles. The Bank 
attracts individual deposits in the commercial market and replaces interest payment 
on financial capital by profit-loss sharing. In this relationship with the subscribers 
the Bank act as Mudarib. The Bank then channelizes the savings into productive 
investment, a part of which is allocated for employment and income generating 
activities of the rural poor through its Rural Development Scheme (RDS). Its 
relationship with borrowers take the form of Rab-ul-Mal (Sarkar, 1998; 
Chowdhury, 1998; Akhtar, 1998). 
Banks based on Shariah principles add equity aspect and ethics to market  
forces and, as indicated earlier (section 4), investor or lender proceed on the basis 
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of collective preferences formed by means of Shuratic deliberation (i.e. Shariah 
council in Banks or orginasation). 
With a view to ascertain adequacy of Shariah-based banks and credit programs 
to customs and valuation of people, their comparative performance in regard to 
accumulating resource or deposit from financial market is appraised in 
Bangladeshis appraised: 
Exponential equation of the following form is applied to private and Islamic 
banks – Private bank 
 
X = Ab
t
        (1) 
where,  
 
X = deposit 
t = time 
 
In logarithmic form, equation (1) is expressed as – 
 
lnX =lnA + t(lnb)       (2) 
or,      x = c1 + c2t        (3) 
 
where, lower case letter x, c1, c2 represent lnX, lnA and lnb, respectively. 
Islamic bank 
 
X
i
 =  A
i
b
it
        (4) 
 
Analogues to private banks – 
 
𝑥𝑖 =  𝑐1
𝑖 +  𝑐2
𝑖 𝑡       (5) 
 
Where, x
i
 and t represent quarterly deposit and time respectively. Estimation of 
equation (3) in regard to private bank yield result provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Deposit Mobilisation – Private Bank Bangladesh (2009-2014). 
Dependent Variable: xi   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 24    
Included observations: 24   
xi = C(1) + C(2)*TIME   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C(1) 16.26372 0.018740 867.8390 0.0000 
C(2) 0.043131 0.001312 32.88506 0.0000 
R-squared 0.980062    Mean dependent var 16.80286 
Adjusted R-squared 0.979156    S.D. dependent var 0.308067 
S.E. of regression 0.044477    Akaike info criterion -3.308025 
Sum squared resid 0.043521    Schwarz criterion -3.209854 
Log likelihood 41.69630    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.281981 
F-statistic 1081.427    Durbin-Watson stat 1.444635 
Source: BB (Various issues). Growth in deposit variable is significant at 0.5 percent level, while R2 
value is 0.980062. Estimation of equation (5) in regard to Islamic banks yield result provided in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Deposit Mobilisation-IslamiBank Bangladesh (2009-2014). 
Dependent Variable: x   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 24    
Included observations: 24   
x = C(1) + C(2)*TIME   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C(1) 14.95878 0.202033 74.04140 0.0000 
C(2) 0.059916 0.014139 4.237525 0.0003 
R-squared 0.449403    Mean dependent var 15.70773 
Adjusted R-squared 0.424376    S.D. dependent var 0.631987 
S.E. of regression 0.479488    Akaike info criterion 1.447461 
Sum squared resid 5.057999    Schwarz criterion 1.545632 
Log likelihood -15.36953    Durbin-Watson stat 2.193486 
F-statistic 17.95662      
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000338    
Source: BB (Various issues). 
 
R
2
 of the equation is relatively low; it may be added that data relating to a 
longer period of time is likely to yield higher R
2
. Limitation of data and resources 
preclude extension of time period for longer duration. DW statistics, however, is 
close to 2, indicating no autocorrelation. Based on t-ratios, growth in deposit 
variable is significant at 0.5 percent level. 
Equation in table 1 can be represented in the form, 
 
lnX = 16.263 + 0.043t      (6) 
 
Equation in table 2 can be represented in the form, 
  
lnX
i
 = 14.958 + 0.059t      (7) 
 
Equation (6) and (7) yield 
 
x = 11.524 (100
3
) (1.044)
t
      (8) 
x
i
 = 3.134 (100
3
) (1.06)
t
      (9) 
 
It is inferred from equation (8) and (9) that growth in deposit of Islamic Shariah 
based banks are marginally higher, compared to private bank. Exponential growth 
of deposit in private commercial bank is 1.04 while growth of deposit in Islamic 
bank is 1.06. 
Effective comparative performance of Islamic bank in accumulating finance is 
evidently very significant. Concept of Shariahbased bankwas new, when these 
bankscommenced inBangladesh. Given the early disadvantage, relatively effective 
functioning of Islamic bank, as is indicated by the comparative appraisal of 
commercial & Islamicbanks, emphasize adequacy of Islamic economic principles 
to customs and valuations prevailing in developing economies as Bangladesh. 
Foregoing appraisal of banks as IBBL in Bangladesh indicate reliably that 
Shariah instruments of financing are sustainable and adequate to reality in view of 
their conformity to custom and actual valuation held by people in Islamic 
communities, providing a basis of resource mobilisation for Banks, with 
microcredit program. The experience of IBBL has been reaffirmed by the 
successful performance of Shariah- based banks and finance companies elsewhere, 
including the Islamic Bank of Bahrain, Jordan Islamic Bank of Finance & 
Investment, Kuwait Finance House, Islamic Development Bank of Jeddah and a 
number of other banks which have replaced interest payment mechanism by 
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Shariah principles and instrument of financing (Chowdhury; 1986). They indicate 
that replacement of inequitable interest payment by a profit-loss sharing and 
Shariah instruments of financing will enhance rather than retard investment funds 
and provide a continuous flow of financing to entrepreneurs (Bashir & Darrat, 
1992; Akhtar, 1998).  
Part of the investment funds generated by IBBL is utilized for entitlement 
formation by the poor landless, laborers and marginal farmers by means of 
microenterprise financing in rural areas as is evident from the predominance of 
Rural Development Scheme (RDS) of the Bank. Table- 3 presents annual 
disbursement of finances to rural poor for employment and income generation by 
IBBL. 
 
Table 3. Performance Rural Development Scheme (RDS) of IBBL 
Year Disbursement(taka in million) 
1996 18.482 
1997 41.878 
1998 71.5156 
1999 194.880 
2000 388.187 
2001 443.557 
(upto Sept.)  
2008 3011.72 
2009 3752.20 
2011 7072.20 
2012 10393.16 
Source : IBBL, Dhaka, October. 2001, IBBL(2012) –  Barsikprotibedon 
 
The performance of IBBL‟s micro investment program as indicated by its 
growth underscores its potential for wider application and replicability, comparable 
to the performance of any of the leading NGOs now working in Bangladesh 
(Sarkar, 1998, Akhtar & Loqman 1998). The rate of recovery of micro investment 
of the IBBL as of April, 2001 is about 99 percent which underline the sustainability 
of the micro investment program of the IBBL (IBBL, 2001). Its percrmance has to 
be viewed in the context of the advantageous position that GB and other NGOs 
possess. Major part of the funding for the GB has been at a preferential rates, 
borrowed from the Bangladesh central bank, international donors and local 
commercial banks (Hashemi & Morshed, 1997). The IBBL does not have access to 
subsidized sources of donor funds like GB, BRAC and other NGOs. The 
performance of the IBBL demonstrates the potential of the Bank to provide 
sustainable mobilization of fund and widespread financial services to the poor 
independent of donor assistance. In addition to the IBBL, microenterpnse schemes 
are also implemented by otherShariah-based organisations, which reinforce the 
experience of IBBL's micro investment program (Sarkar, 1998; Athar & Loqman, 
1998). 
The poverty focused micro investment program for the poor by IBBL partly 
represents Banks depositor or investors, individual or firms, ethical transaction and 
altruistic expenditure. These investors' motivation to sustain the outlay of the 
program is based partly on their Islamic belief; the resulting benefit represents 
reward in the akhira(other world). The worldly equivalent of these element become 
quantifiable as benefits in the form of increased labor productivity and income of 
the beneficiaries (part 4 above). 
Performance of welfare oriented micro credit program implemented under RDS 
of the IBBL with resource mobilized in the market, provide supportive evidence 
that the Shariah principles beratingfixed interest payment and profiteering enables 
lenders rationality to be adapted to 'equity principle' and incorporate ethics and 
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altruism, in addition to income and resource constraints, as important consumption 
bundles in the utilitarian function of the investors or lenders to be maximized. The 
adaptive rationality and the altruistic framework of decision making and resource 
allocation represented by welfare and Shariahbanking of this nature envisages that 
preference formation is based on individual will acting in conformity with 
collective or Shuratic preferences and that benefits or welfare gained by each 
individual depend not only on his or her own utility but also on ethical value and 
his or her contribution to the utility of others. The experience and potential of 
IBBL demonstrates that Shariah instruments of resource mobilization and micro 
creditfinancing  are sustainable and adequate to reality in view of their conformity 
to customs and actual valuations held by people in Islamic communities. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis studies the deficiency of the neo-liberal policy agenda 
that aims at transforming non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in 
poverty alleviation into formal financial institutions seeking access to capital 
market functioning on a commercial basis. The paper at the same time examines 
the Islamic scheme of micro enterprise financings as an alternative framework for 
welfare programs. The paper contends that poverty focused credit programs aimed 
at distributive equity are logically inconsistent with an ethically neutral liberal 
market order characterized by interest-based financing and lender's 'rationality'. In 
contrast, Islamic economic principles affirm the logical consistency of poverty-
focused financing programs seeking access to resources in financial markets, 
characterized by the presence of altruistic, ethical elements in the consumption 
menu of the individual' asrepresented by the Shariah instruments prohibiting 
interest and profiteering and promoting charity. 
The paper studies the logical consistency and adequacy to reality of the Islamic 
principles to actual conditions, customs and valuating prevailing in the Bangladesh 
economy. It finds supportive evidence that 'Islamic economic principles, by 
incorporating ethics and altruism as important consumption bundles in the 
utilitarian function of the depositors or investors to be maximized, ensures 
continuous flow of financing to credit program, as indicated by the financial and 
welfare banking program introduced by the IBBL and other Shariah-based banks 
in Bangladesh. 
The modern neo-liberal approach prompts the NGOs to meet the demand for 
micro credit on a competitive commercial basis with access to capital market and 
full - cost pricing of services. This approach resembles the classical utilitarian 
appeal for leaving everything to the market for not allowing compassion to inter-
fere with economic process (Galbraith, 1958). The new agenda is reminiscent of 
the tradition which had advocated, a with post-feudal Europe the abolition of 
English Poor Law, an Act framed to alleviate poverty, supported by a fund 
subscribed by each church parish (locality) for the benefit of the poor. To urge the 
NGOs serving the poor to be profitable and efficient in an ethically neutral market 
order is to expose the poor to the built-in critera that insecurity and vicissitude of 
the competitive market is essential for efficiency and sustenance.  
Shariah based financing provides an alternative vision which stands apart from 
the harsh neo-liberal policy agenda. Available evidence from the IBBL's experi-
ence of its resource mobilization and micro program indicate that Shariah modes 
ensure a sustained flow of financing to microenterprises relying on market driven 
forces without government or aid assistance - a conclusion that could not be validly 
applied to traditional NGOs in Bangladesh. 
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